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Judge Analytics. Party Analytics. Law Firm Analytics. Interested in this case? Request a Demo Track this case, and find millions of cases like it, let us show you how. Division Civil. Filed July 5, Case Type Other Contract Unlimited In the petition for a fresh trial, Linna's lawyer presented a long, newly recorded film with the star witness, aimed at showing that he gave incorrect information, and that he has changed his story on several crucial points.
Ahead of his new day in court, Kai Linna, now in his 50's, told Swedish Radio's local channel in Norrbotten that he is expecting that the trial will lead to his release, after 13 years in prison. I am counting on being released. He reviewed the autopsy report, photographs of the crime scene and Josselson's preliminary hearing testimony.
Herrmann took notes during his review and, although he did not remember talking to Ye's trial attorney after the review, he was "sure" that he did. At the hearing on the motion for new trial and in his declaration in support of the motion, Herrmann testified that he did not believe Edward's death was accidental.
He believed it was a homicide. He also did not believe Edward died solely due to the head wounds. Edward might have suffered acute heart failure in response to an attack due to his poor medical condition. Herrmann testified that it could not be determined to a medical certainty that Edward was manually strangled. Herrmann's original notes indicated that he could not dispute the cause of death, as Josselson's conclusion of a combination of blunt-force trauma and manual strangulation was "certainly.
It was also a "small possibility," consistent with the evidence, that Edward was knocked unconscious due to blows on his head, which would allow for easier obstruction of the airways without much compression. In her motion for new trial, Ye argued that Herrmann's testimony could have raised a reasonable doubt about whether Edward was murdered.
The court rejected the argument. Herrmann in fact opined that Edward's death was a homicide. Noting that it had presided over two full trials and one partial trial in the case and was very familiar with the facts, the court concluded that Herrmann "had nothing to really say that was going to be of assistance to the defense. He actually either died of a heart arrhythmia after a sudden excitement and events of being struck on the head, or he passed out from being struck on the head and in the slumped position with his head up against the wall and compressed on his chest, the airway was closed and he asphyxiated himself.
I mean, it all comes down to the same thing. The trial court rejected the new trial motion on the ground that Herrmann's testimony could not raise a reasonable doubt about whether Edward was murdered. On appeal, however, Ye argues the testimony could have raised a reasonable doubt about whether the perpetrator acted with malice aforethought, that is whether the crime was murder or manslaughter. Her argument might find support in the law. Garcia Cal. Burroughs 35 Cal.
Blakeley 23 Cal. Butler Cal. Phillips 64 Cal. Flood 18 Cal. Stamp 2 Cal. However, two unresolved issues preclude us from finding ineffective assistance of counsel. First, it is not clear on this record that Herrmann advised Ye's attorney before trial that his testimony would support the claim she now makes. The only substantial difference between the opinions expressed by Hermann and those of Josselson was that Herrmann did not believe that manual strangulation could be established as a matter of reasonable medical certainty.
He agreed that Josselson's conclusion of a combination of blunt-force trauma and manual strangulation was "certainly. She might well have concluded that it would be preferable to focus Ye's defense on her alibi and denial of any responsibility for Edward's death a tactic that seems to have been reasonably successful in the first trial rather than attempting to mitigate the responsibility of what she alleged was a culpable third party. Mitcham 1 Cal. Ye argues her attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to McBroom's testimony that he eliminated Reding as a suspect based on an investigation report he received from Oettinger.
In its rebuttal case, the prosecution recalled McBroom and elicited testimony that he was the lead detective on Edward's homicide and that he directed Oettinger to investigate Reding's whereabouts on November 3, The prosecutor then asked:. Oettinger never testified about the investigation of Reding.
We investigated [D. Two out of three of them. The third one sits in this courtroom. Ye argues her trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to McBroom's rebuttal testimony about the investigation of Reding. The People note that Ye objected twice on hearsay grounds, but the objections were overruled, and they contend the court's ruling was correct.
Ye responds that her trial attorney did not adequately object to all of the objectionable questions and that the court's action in overruling of her objections violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The evident purpose for which the testimony was elicited was to obviate defense arguments that the police investigation ignored other possible suspects, including Reding, and focused solely on Ye. Defense Counsel argued that the "circle" of the investigation was "too small.
They should have pushed that circle bigger. It should have included some other people in the circle when it came to the collection of evidence, when it came to an investigation of this crime. As the court observed in overruling the defense objections to McBroom's testimony, the evidence could be properly received for a limited nonhearsay purpose—to explain the detective's actions in defining the scope of his investigation.
Ye's argument is that the testimony should still have been excluded as hearsay because it essentially communicated the content of out-of-court statements—Oettinger's statements about the statements of people he questioned during his investigation of Reding—for the purpose of proving the truth of both sets of statements.
In other words, McBroom's testimony communicated to the jury that Oettinger's investigative report accounted for Reding's whereabouts on November 3, , for the purpose of proving that Reding had a valid alibi for the time period in which Edward might have been murdered. See Bell, supra, 49 Cal. Douglas 50 Cal. Melton 44 Cal. However, since the evidence was admissible for the more limited purpose, Ye's trial attorney forfeited the issue by failing to request a limiting admonishment or instruction to the jury that the evidence should not be considered evidence of the truth of the implied results of Oettinger's investigation, and for not objecting to the prosecutor's final argument that Reding and D.
Proctor, supra, 4 Cal. Further, Ye again fails to affirmatively meet her burden of establishing prejudice and the likelihood of a different result had an appropriate limiting instruction been given. Ye argues that her trial attorney provided ineffective assistance in several other respects. None of these arguments has merit. Ye argues her trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately impeach Reding with his prior testimony on three separate issues.
Ye argues on appeal that her attorney could have impeached Reding's testimony that the sandals in evidence belonged to Ye because "at the first trial [he] made no claim that these brown sandals were [Ye]'s. This testimony supported an inference that the sandals in evidence belonged to D.
Ye does not argue that an ambiguity about whether they belonged to her or D. Ye made no effort at trial to raise suspicions about her son's culpability. Because Reding's testimony at the first trial was specific and it supported an inference that the sandals in evidence belonged to Ye, a reasonably competent attorney could conclude there was a danger of prejudice in using the testimony to impeach Reding at the third trial and thus could reasonably decide not to do so.
At the first trial, Reding was asked three times on cross-examination if he made a call to Ye while the call was being taped by the police i. The defense later called a law enforcement witness who testified that he had Reding place a pretext call to Ye from the Benicia Police Department on November 4, , and that Reding knew the call was being tape recorded. At the third trial, the prosecutor asked Reding on direct examination if he recalled participating in a phone call to Ye in the evening of November 4, , and he said he did.
The prosecutor then asked if he recalled that he had denied participating in the pretext call during the first trial. Reding testified that he recalled the prior testimony which the prosecutor read to the jury and had Reding confirm and testified that by the time of the third trial he recalled that he did participate in the call. The prosecutor elicited testimony that Reding was in shock when he made the call because he had only recently learned his father had been murdered.
The prosecutor brought out the inconsistent prior testimony on direct examination as a way of neutralizing its impeachment value, and defense counsel had little to add to the subject on cross-examination. As shown by the prosecutor's closing argument at the first trial, unproductively harping on the issue might have fed into a prosecution argument that defense counsel was trying to shift the focus away from her client by putting Reding on trial.
Moreover, defense counsel had far more immediate impeachment evidence which she pursued in her cross-examination of Reding—his false testimony from earlier that day regarding a phone conversation he had after Sylvester's testimony about the air conditioning unit.
In these circumstances, defense counsel had a readily apparent tactical reason for not reiterating impeachment evidence already before the jury, and since the evidence was before the jury, Ye also cannot show she suffered any prejudice.
On direct examination, Reding was asked how he chose to clean up the bathroom after Edward's body was removed and he responded, "I chose to clean it up myself. It felt very impersonal to have some service [come to clean it up], and I felt a duty to my father to clean it up, so I stayed and a friend came over to sit vigil with me and I cleaned the bathroom up that night.
In other words, he volunteered the information that someone accompanied him as he cleaned the bathroom. On cross-examination, Reding acknowledged that friend was Greenbaum, the person who accompanied Reding on his trip to the health retreat shortly after Edward returned home from the hospital in August At the first trial, Reding had not mentioned that anyone was with him while he cleaned the bathroom.
However, he was not specifically asked if he was accompanied by anyone at that time. Ye argues that her trial attorney should have impeached Reding with his failure to mention Greenbaum when he described his clean-up of the bathroom. She postulates that her attorney would have elicited testimony that Reding deliberately omitted mention of Greenbaum at the first trial, which would suggest he was being less than fully candid on the witness stand, or that he forgot about Greenbaum when he testified at the first trial, which would suggest his memory was unreliable.
As we have noted however, it is difficult to effectively impeach a witness with a lack of response to a question that was never asked. Moreover, the fact that at the third trial Reding volunteered the information that Greenbaum was with him during the clean-up would seriously undermine any implication that Reding deliberately withheld the information at the first trial.
Regarding Reding's unreliable memory, defense counsel already had other more potent impeachment evidence. Ye argues her trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to Michael Jr. Ye's claim fails because the testimony was not inadmissible hearsay. Evidence Code section provides, "Evidence of a statement previously made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is consistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section The clear implication of the cross-examination was that the threat were fabricated or exaggerated after Edward's death in order to inculpate Ye.
Indeed, in opening argument, defense counsel had told the jury, "The doctor will pin down this time when he goes on vacation as the pivotal point in this case. He will say although he's been with Ms. Ye for three years, within three months she becomes a dangerous woman, threatening him. Those threats are told later.
Months later he makes a list. The reality is, nobody else hears about the threats, and if they do, they are looking back from to In this context, Michael Jr. Ye argues her trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue to the jury that the evidence that Edward's stomach was empty proved he was killed after Ye had left the home.
Josselson testified that Edward's stomach contained only a small amount of fluid and no identifiable food particles or pills, and he told the jury it generally takes about four to six hours for a person's stomach to empty after eating, although there is some variation.
Ye testified that she made breakfast for Edward and ate breakfast with him after she returned from taking D. Because school began at a. If Edward ate between and a. However, no other evidence corroborated Ye's testimony about when Edward ate that morning. The only other evidence on the subject was Reding's testimony that Edward typically got up at or , took his vitamins, ate cereal or oatmeal, and read the paper, and that when Reding got up at about a. On this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Edward ate sometime between and a.
In light of Josselson's testimony, that timeline would have been consistent with a finding that Ye killed Edward at about a. Alternatively, the jury could have inferred as the prosecutor contended in closing argument that Edward never ate breakfast that morning because Ye killed him before he had a chance to do so. That scenario also would have been consistent with Josselson's testimony. Ye argues her trial attorney provided ineffective assistance because she failed to obtain transcripts of the hearings on motions in limine and the arguments to the jury from the first trial.
She produces no evidence on appeal that the attorney failed to do so. Even if we were to assume the truth of the assertion, Ye has not shown how the omission prejudiced her at trial. She argues her trial attorney would have been alerted to Reding's denial of the pretext call if she had read the defense closing argument at the first trial, but we have already concluded that trial counsel committed no error with respect to that issue.
Ye also argues that her attorney would have noticed the defense's successful motion in limine excluding Michael Jr. Failure to affirmatively establish prejudice is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Rodrigues 8 Cal. Rodrigues v. California U. Finally, Ye argues the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying her request for a continuance of the trial. She argues that the deficient performance of her trial attorney on numerous grounds resulted from the trial court's denial of a continuance, which deprived her of adequate time to prepare for trial.
Thus, she argues, this is her strongest issue on appeal. The claim lacks merit. Kathryn Barton, Ye's attorney at the third trial, was appointed to represent Ye on March 27, , the day after a mistrial was declared at the second trial.
The court offered to put the matter over a few days so Barton could review the record and be prepared to discuss a trial date. Barton agreed and suggested a follow-up hearing on April 3. She assured the court this gave her enough time. The prosecutor informed the court that he was trying to contact all of his witnesses about their vacation schedules so that he too would be prepared to discuss the trial date at the April 3 hearing.
At the April 3 hearing, Barton requested a September trial date. The court suggested a trial date of September The court asked Barton, "[W]ill that give you sufficient time to be ready to go? The court set trial for September In June , Linna Ye was charged with his murder and released on bail. Due to several continuances, the case did not initially go to trial until April first trial.
That jury could not reach a unanimous verdict and the court declared a mistrial. A second trial began on March 25, After an unsuccessful Marsden motion 1 on the second day of trial, Ye stipulated to dismissal of the jury and declaration of a mistrial. Ye was appointed new counsel the next day and a third trial commenced September 23, Because the case against Ye was largely circumstantial, we discuss the evidence in some detail.
Ye lived with Edward and his son, Dr. She and Reding were romantically involved on and off from the year to September They had a rocky relationship. Michael Jr. Edward came to visit in August and stayed through November 3, Ye stayed in the upstairs bedroom with Reding until September , when she moved downstairs into Michael Jr.
After Ye moved in, her relationship with Reding deteriorated and he repeatedly asked her to move out, but she did not. After this incident, he needed greater support at home. Ye agreed to look after him on the final weekend.
A dispute arose between Reding and Ye about whether Ye adequately cared for Edward that weekend. When Reding returned from his trip, he told Ye to move to Michael Jr. Reding consulted a lawyer about how to get Ye out of the house without conflict, since she had not complied with his previous requests.
Reding asked Ye to leave many times, every few days, and she usually responded with a threat. Well, that could happen. Ye did not specifically testify about the alleged threats.
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